Latin America has never been a priority for British intelligence. That was all too clear back in 1982, when Argentina seized the Falkland Islands with little warning.
MI6 operates relatively few stations in the region, and GCHQ leaves most of the work of intercepting communications to the Americans.
There are operations in Colombia and the Caribbean for countering the drugs trade. Some of the sharing with the US over these was suspended late last year as Washington began striking Venezuelan boats amid concern that British military and intelligence officers could become complicit in war crimes. But the reality was that this kind of intelligence – information about speedboats moving around the West Indies, for instance – was low level and largely irrelevant to the US.
The US did not need any UK help – of the military or intelligence varities – to carry out the operation to capture Nicolás Maduro. This was America first and America alone, a display of power and skill when it comes to intelligence and military force even if the political aftermath is unclear. But even if it played no role, the implications of that operation for London and British intelligence services are profound.
Other countries’ intelligence services will also be scrambling to work out what it all means – perhaps none more so than the spies of Beijing. A senior Chinese envoy was meeting Maduro just hours before the latter was taken by US special forces. Not only did Chinese intelligence fail to see the operation coming, but they look now to have lost a crucial foothold in Latin America. As well as growing commercial influence and debt leverage, Beijing was also more quietly expanding its military and intelligence footprint across the region, from Venezuela to Argentina (where it has a space-tracking station) to Cuba (where it allegedly has listening stations).
This growing Chinese influence was one reason Washington was keen to act. The Monroe doctrine of 1823 sought to keep other powers out of America’s backyard. In those days that meant European powers such as Britain and Spain in Latin America and Russia in the Pacific Northwest. The modern Trump corollary to that doctrine is more about China and pushing back its growing influence.
The problem for Britain, though, is that even if interests in Latin America are relatively narrow, the “Donroe doctrine” has implications that reach its shores thanks to the northern part of America’s backyard. Canada is not going to be invaded or see its prime minister snatched from his bed, but American assertiveness has already put pressure on the Five Eyes alliance of English-speaking nations, of which the US, UK and Canada are part. It has been a central pillar of British intelligence since the end of the second world war but has already been entering a more complex phase with sub-arrangements such as the Aukus alliance of Australia, the UK and US. The relationship between the US and Canada over tariffs has at some points spilled over into talk about how it might affect wider security relationships. They have yet to break down, but the old cozy Five Eyes meetings are going to be a thing of the past.
Greenland presents the biggest headache for London. Britain has reinforced the strong talk from Denmark – which runs the territory – that Washington should back off its claims that it wants to take over. That is in response to President Trump reiterating his assertion that Greenland is needed for US Security, and with talk about Russian and Chinese ships operating there. But Washington’s desire for control risks straining Nato to breaking point as one member makes clear its desire to take territory off another. If an outsider behaved in that way, it would trigger talk of Article Five collective self-defence.
Similarly, if any other country were behaving as Washington is behaving, a top priority for other countries’ spies would be collecting intelligence about the real intentions of its leadership. That kind of collection is a no for Britain, as under the Five Eyes deal members are not supposed to spy on each other. Even an operation as unorthodox as the capture of Maduro will not trigger a change in that policy, particularly since spying on Washington is barely needed anyway, when figures there openly telegraph their ambitions and boast of their intentions over social media, posting pictures of Greenland covered by an American flag.
On an operational level, British spies may still be working effectively with American counterparts in many regions of the world such as the Middle East. But in the wake of Venezuela, the British intelligence strategy of staying close while keeping heads down and hoping the storm passes will become much harder to sustain.
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Photograph by Mark Schiefelbein/AP


