Europe has three options for involvement with Ukraine

At the same time European nations have demonstrated by their reluctance to become involved in the ongoing conflict that they have little interest in committing themselves to fight for Ukraine. There is a significant risk that Europe puts small “tripwire” forces into the country and that Russia calls Europe’s bluff, anticipating that it will withdraw as they did before the February 2022 invasion. If Russia is wrong and Europe fights, then both sides risk a great power war between nuclear powers that neither side wants.

The logical solution is for Europe to prepare a force for deployment that is large enough to make the seriousness of its commitment to defend Ukraine manifest, such that Russia does not test it. The problem for European countries is that this would require a rise in defence budget, while regenerating military capability also takes time, so preparations would need to be made before a ceasefire comes into effect. But such overt preparations might also convince the Kremlin that it is better off continuing to fight Ukraine.

There are arguably three approaches to a deployed security force that could deliver the desired result. One is to assume that the Russian military will take some time to reset for the renewal of hostilities, allowing Europe to put a large number of trainers into Ukraine to accelerate the regeneration of its defensive combat power. Without making explicit commitments to Ukraine, such an approach would make further aggression by Russia harder and leave Moscow uncertain whether European nations would send more troops in the future.

The second option would be the commitment of extensive training in Ukraine and a formal pledge to protect the country, with the combat power on offer primarily being delivered by the air component. Such an approach would mean that Moscow would have to plan on dealing with a large increase in firepower confronting its forces in Ukraine. The problem for European states with this scenario is that the continent does not have stockpiles of appropriate air-launched munitions.

Finally, there is the potential for the training force, air component and the fielding of a multinational division in Ukraine. A division is not enough to fight a land war against Russia. However, 15,000 people and their equipment cannot be withdrawn quickly, so this would signal to the Kremlin that if it reinvaded Ukraine it would have to contend with these forces and the states that sent them.

The cost would be severe though. To remain a division in the field its units must be rotated, so 45,000 personnel would need to be “force generated” over time to sustain it. After decades of cuts to militaries combined with Europe’s inefficient defence establishments, such numbers are a stretch. Fixing these forces in Ukraine would remove them from the pool of units that can currently be mobilised to defend Nato. In short, such a commitment would rapidly expose the hollowness of much European military power and therefore demand sizeable investments.

Beyond the question of the force’s composition, there is also the question of who commands it, what decisions that commander can make and how much alignment there is between contributing countries on what will or will not be approved by capitals. The reality is that a multinational division would need to come from two or three. Politically, European states need as many capitals as possible to be committed to defending Ukraine.

All of this becomes irrelevant if a ceasefire cannot be reached. While it is important that a European coalition of the willing debates and refines its offer, it does not reduce the need to continue to fund and arm Ukraine’s defenders. It is Ukraine’s resistance today that will determine what is possible tomorrow.

Dr Jack Watling is senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute

Photograph by Danylo Antoniuk/AP